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Syria after the Russian Intervention 
Moscow Tips the Military Balance in Favor of the Regime, Pursues Parallel Diplomacy 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
Russian airstrikes turned the tide of the conflict in favor of the regime of Bashar 
al-Assad. Moscow announced a reduction in its military presence in Syria in March 
2016 but has maintained its infrastructure in the country while continuing to build up 
Assad’s forces. The cessation of hostilities achieved through a deal between the United 
States and Russia has lessened the number of attacks against civilians and curbed fight-
ing, but rebel areas remain under siege. At the same time, Russia has been keen to dis-
play its interest in an international, cooperative solution. Regardless of whether Mos-
cow’s intentions are sincere or mere lip service, the peace talks underway in Geneva, 
could provide Germany and the European Union with means to bolster the ceasefire. 
They should push for a solution that curbs the security sector and other tools of repres-
sion, which are dominated by Assad’s Alawite minority, rather than for a mere change 
of personnel at the leadership level. Without such substantial change, the dynamics 
prompting the influx of refugees is unlikely to change substantially. 
 
Despite many misgivings, the Syrian oppo-
sition had little choice but to attend the 
negotiations currently underway in Geneva. 
On the one hand, Russian air support em-
boldened regime troops to advance and cut 
off vital supply lines. On the other, support 
for rebel groups dried up in the run-up to 
the conference known as Geneva III, largely 
as a result of US pressure on Turkey and 
the Gulf States. Squeezed from all sides, the 
opposition found itself with its back to the 
wall. Initially, an increase in Russian carpet 
bombing on and around Aleppo threatened 
to scuttle the talks before they even began. 
The deadlock was broken by an agreement 
between Moscow and Washington for a 
“cessation of hostilities” in Syria that ex-
cluded groups recognized as terrorist by the 
UN Security Council – at this point, Islamic 
State and Jabhat al-Nusra (the Nusra Front). 
Two weeks later, Moscow announced that 
it would largely pull out from Syria, while 
intensifying its diplomatic efforts. So far, 
evaluations of whether the Russian draw-
down will indeed be substantial appear 
premature. However, there are indications 
that Russia and Assad may no longer be 
entirely on the same page. Observers have 
taken note that the Russian announcement 
occurred before a background of intransi-
gence was displayed by the Syrian regime, 
and exactly two days after Damascus had 
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dismissed the idea of holding early presi-
dential elections – a main plank of the 
Geneva talks. Russia, the United States, and 
other members of the International Syria 
Support Group (ISSG) agreed in Vienna in 
November 2015 on a UN-supervised ballot 
within 18 months as part of a framework 
for a political transition. A UN Security 
Council resolution in December 2015 fur-
ther endorsed the Vienna framework. ISSG 
members, including Germany, are also part 
of a task force set up to monitor the cease-
fire. Although the ISSG is dominated by the 
United States and Russia, the two countries 
are obliged to share information with the 
remaining members, potentially giving 
them more say. The ceasefire task force is 
also charged with delineating areas where 
terrorist organizations operate, and which 
are hence considered legitimate targets. 
Since Jabhat al-Nusra, unlike Islamic State, 
has often operated near and sometimes in 
cooperation with Free Syrian Army (FSA) 
brigades and other rebel groups, these deci-
sions are liable to be contentious. 
The Russian-Alawite Link 
Russia might be prepared to pressure the 
Damascus regime into concessions – and 
perhaps even sacrifice Assad himself at a 
later stage – to present itself as an actor 
capable of delivering solutions. Yet, Moscow 
has shown no signs of lessening its backing 
for Alawite officials, as well as the top 
Alawite military and security tiers, whose 
disproportional presence in the state and 
security structure was a major factor in 
the tensions that fueled the 2011 uprising. 
The Vienna declaration emphasized the 
preservation of state institutions, which 
could serve as a justification to retain much 
of the Alawite-dominated military and secu-
rity apparatus that has underpinned the 
power structure for the past five decades. 
The links between these groups and Russia 
have deep roots. Since the times of the USSR, 
Moscow’s relationship with Syria had cen-
tered on the Alawite ruling elite and officer 
class, many of whom had received training 
in Russia. After Assad succeeded his father 
in 2000, Russia also became more involved 
in Syria’s small but substantial oil and gas 
sector, where they often partnered with 
relatives of Assad. As war raged in the inte-
rior and the oil fields were lost to Islamic 
State or Kurdish militias, the authorities 
awarded a Russian company the rights 
for offshore gas exploration in the coastal 
waters around Latakia in 2013, although no 
actual exploration has taken place thus far. 
Even if Moscow were indeed to pull most 
of its troops out of Syria, it would retain the 
new airbase near the Alawite mountains – 
the nerve center of the intervention. Russia 
has thus secured a strategic foothold in 
the eastern Mediterranean, but it relies on 
continued close relations with the current 
power holders in Damascus. 
Reversal of the Military Picture 
Russia’s entry into the war occurred at a 
point when the Assad regime was clearly on 
the ropes. After the inauguration in Janu-
ary 2015 of the new Saudi king, Salman bin 
Abdulaziz Al Saud, joint mediation by Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey facilitated a new 
rebel coalition by the name of Jaish al-Fatah 
(Army of Conquest), which was mainly com-
prised of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, 
a Salafist group with a history of tense – and 
often violent – relationships with Jabhat 
al-Nusra. Western-backed FSA brigades, 
while not forming a part of Jaish al-Fatah, 
contributed to significant advances by the 
new alliance by deploying anti-tank mis-
siles, which helped to disrupt the supply 
lines of loyalist troops. By fall 2015, the 
offensive threatened to cut off Assad’s seat 
of power in Damascus from his home 
region on the coast, where the bulk of what 
has remained of the regime’s army and 
militia reservoir are recruited. 
Russian firepower altered this military 
landscape dramatically. By the time the 
ceasefire came into effect, Assad and his 
foreign militia allies were coming close 
to sealing off rebel areas in the north and 
interior. Aside from airpower, Moscow 
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deployed multiple rocket launchers manned 
by Russian personnel with more oblitera-
tion capacity than the ones used by Assad’s 
army. Still, rebels offered stiff resistance 
and held key supply junctions in northern 
and central Syria, without which they 
would have been completely cut off. Even 
after the ceasefire, fighting has persisted 
along such strategic fronts. Russia appears 
to have provided Assad’s military with 
stronger armor and more advanced equip-
ment since 2015. However, since Russia is 
reluctant to put a large number of soldiers 
on the ground, the regime would still need 
more involvement from its Shiite allies, 
which it cannot necessarily take for granted. 
Iran’s priority appears to have been secur-
ing Shiite areas and Shiite shrines in Syria, 
as well as territories along the border with 
Lebanon, thus guarding Hezbollah’s back 
and the supply corridors between the two 
countries. In contrast, the regime has strug-
gled to hold territory on its own. Deeper 
Iranian involvement may be in the offing 
if rebels recover and go back on the attack. 
Still, Russian bombardment dislodged 
the rebels from most of the high ground 
around Latakia by early 2016. Turkey’s 
downing of a Russian warplane over the 
region in November 2015 prompted an 
escalation of the airstrikes, which forced 
most rebels to retreat to Idlib. Under Rus-
sian cover, regime forces and Hezbollah 
chipped away at northern supply junctures 
to opposition areas, squeezing rebels be-
tween the regime and Islamic State in the 
governorate of Aleppo, and in Hama and 
Homs further south. In private, rebel 
leaders criticized Turkey for what they 
described as provoking more Russian air 
attacks without increasing or upgrading 
their weapons supplies. By mid-February 
2016, the raids had killed many rebel 
commanders among an estimated 2,000 
anti-Assad combatants, as well as 1,400 
civilians. A commander of the “Free Men of 
the Middle Mountain Brigade,” nominally 
part of Ahrar al-Sham, reported dozens 
of airstrikes in a single day on the town 
of Salma above Latakia, subsequently re-
captured by the regime. Surviving members 
of the brigade largely withdrew to their 
home region near Jisr al-Shughour in the 
Idlib province, which is also defended by 
Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and Turkic 
fighters from central Asia. 
The regime’s consolidation of the environ-
ments of Latakia placed it in a commanding 
position to attack Idlib and cut off vital road 
intersections leading south. But subsequent 
territorial gains in the interior have been 
limited, with rebels preserving main front-
lines in Hama and Homs. In the two regions, 
the rebels appear more solidly implanted 
than in the north, partly because their 
commanders are reared in the local com-
munities, and the groups do not prey upon 
the local population as much as further 
north. 
Aleppo Strangled 
Idlib has become the last remaining rebel 
inlet in the north after the road connecting 
Aleppo to the Turkish border near the town 
of Azaz was severed. In February 2016, parts 
of the Azaz corridor were taken by loyalist 
forces. Other stretches are under the con-
trol of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a 
Kurdish militia controlled by the Democratic 
Union Party (PYD), which is in turn affili-
ated with the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK). Operating out of Afrin to the 
northwest of Aleppo, the YPG militias have 
a tense relationship with the rebels of the 
region. The city itself, which was Syria’s 
commercial and industrial hub before the 
war, has been broadly divided between a 
regime-controlled western and a rebel-held 
eastern sector since 2012. With the Azaz 
corridor cut off, Assad’s forces closed in on 
Castello Road, Aleppo’s last land outlet not 
with the regime. YPG militia from the 
Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsoud 
also attacked the road, in effect helping the 
regime to lay a near siege on Aleppo. Yet, 
in a rare attack in March 2016, fighters of 
Islamic State captured a road connecting 
the government-held sectors of Aleppo to 
the south, indirectly relieving pressure on 
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the rebels in the city. Jund al-Aqsa – a Sala-
fist brigade nominally part of Jaish al-Fatah 
– apparently participated in the attack, 
raising the specter of major defections to 
Islamic State should the rebels decide that 
their supposed Sunni allies have abandoned 
them, whether it be Turkey, the Gulf States, 
or Jordan. Islamic State itself has thus far 
been only a secondary target for the Russian 
attacks, despite the fact that their extrem-
ism has served as a major argument to jus-
tify the Russian intervention. One major 
exception has been the ancient city of Pal-
myra, where massive Russian bombardment 
prepared the ground for the capture of the 
city by Assad’s forces and associated militia, 
in the first defeat inflicted on Islamic State 
with Russian assistance. 
Ramifications in the South 
In another blow to the opposition, Mos-
cow’s intervention forced a near shutdown 
of the only other route available to the 
rebels: through the southern border with 
Jordan. The Jordanian establishment did 
not welcome what it perceived as the in-
creasingly Islamist character of the Syrian 
revolt and feared a Muslim Brotherhood 
ascendency next door. Thus, the Kingdom 
mostly acted as a conduit for US and Saudi 
support to moderate rebels in the south 
and the suburbs of Damascus. As a result, 
jihadist groups failed to develop much trac-
tion in southern Syria, prompting for in-
stance Jabhat al-Nusra to transfer a signifi-
cant part of its fighters to the north. How-
ever, by the second half of 2015, Riyadh had 
shifted priorities to reverse the setbacks it 
had suffered in its intervention in Yemen. 
The United States, for its part, refocused 
efforts on creating proxies that would be 
willing to fight Islamic State without seek-
ing the downfall of Assad. 
After the Russian campaign started in 
September 2015, Jordan chose to accom-
modate Russia and accepted to set up what 
Moscow described as a “special working 
mechanism” with the Jordanian military. 
What exactly this cooperation entails re-
mains unclear, although there are allega-
tions that intelligence-sharing has helped 
Russia identify targets for its attacks. Sup-
port to the FSA brigades was largely cut off, 
forcing the rebels to withdraw from the stra-
tegically important Sheikh Miskeen military 
base, which was seized by Assad’s army and 
Hezbollah militia after heavy Russian bomb-
ing in January 2016. The Russian airstrikes 
on Sheikh Miskeen and other targets in the 
south coincided with increasing numbers 
of assassinations in Deraa, which killed 
about two dozen FSA commanders. 
New US Proxies 
The rise of Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra 
contributed to growing American wariness 
that Syria could turn into another jihadist 
haven if Assad were to be deposed. As jihad-
ist groups rampaged in Libya and Yemen, 
Washington objected little to the Russian 
offensive; instead, it worked with Moscow 
to convene the Geneva talks. Militarily, 
Washington strengthened the Kurdish YPG 
militia, which number in the thousands, 
and set up smaller Arab auxiliary forces, 
many of which were trained by US person-
nel in Jordan. These Arab forces mostly hail 
from tribes in the east of Syria and, although 
nominally independent, often cooperate 
closely with the YPG. One such force, called 
the New Syrian Army, made its operational 
debut in March 2016 when it launched – 
under the cover of US airstrikes – a failed 
attack on Tanaf, a Syrian border-crossing 
with Iraq that is also close to the Jordanian 
border. Tanaf had been controlled by Islamic 
State since the group overran eastern Syria 
in 2013 and killed those who refused to 
pledge allegiance. The Shueitat tribe of Deir 
al-Zor sustained many of these casualties, 
and now forms a main component of the 
Syrian New Army, alongside tribes from the 
Homs and Raqqa regions, whose lot also 
worsened under Islamic State. 
By shoring up Arab clients, Washington 
can hope to prevent the jihadists from ex-
ploiting misgivings over perceived Kurdish 
expansionism and razing of Arab villages, 
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which Amnesty International said amounts 
to war crimes. 
Backing disgruntled tribes and Arab 
militia also allows Washington to bypass 
the FSA, which Washington rarely trusted, 
as well as other rebels who insist that the 
fight against Islamic State and Assad had to 
go in tandem, since his continued presence 
would only cause more extremism. Yet, their 
argument mostly fell on deaf ears. The US 
approach has also angered Turkey. Ankara 
has attempted to curb the expansion of 
the YPG along the border and challenged 
Russia’s unfettered hand in Syria without 
receiving much support from its fellow 
NATO members. Wary of a deepening split 
with Ankara, in March 2016 Washington 
opposed a unilateral PYD declaration of a 
“federal” region in northern Syria, without 
however being able to placate Turkish con-
cerns. It was US airstrikes that helped the 
YPG to grab vast amounts of territory along 
the Turkish border. 
Emboldened YPG 
Turkish concerns about the Kurdish ascend-
ency only deepened with the Russian inter-
vention. Already backed by the United States, 
the Kurdish militia now have the option to 
also work with Russia, expand its land grab 
in northern Syria, and play Washington and 
Moscow against each other as it bids for sup-
port from both. Determined to advance to 
the Turkish border, the YPG attacked US-
backed FSA units with the support of Rus-
sian airstrikes. The attack made the United 
States appear not in control of its YPG proxy, 
which Washington had touted as its most 
trusted ally in Syria in the fight against 
Islamic State. But rebels managed to hold 
on to Azaz, which is 10 km across the bor-
der. The town and the countryside to the 
east controlled by Islamic State are the only 
remaining obstacles between the Afrin en-
clave and the Kurdish-controlled cantons 
of Kobane and Qamishli in the east. Linking 
these areas would create a geographically 
contiguous area under Kurdish control 
along most of the Syrian-Turkish border – 
thus giving a significant boost to claims for 
Kurdish autonomy – and is hence a strategic 
goal for the YPG/PYD. For the same reason, 
it is also the ultimate strategic nightmare 
of Turkey, which finds itself in a renewed 
confrontation with the PKK. 
Responding to what it regards as PKK 
provocation in Syria, Turkey transported 
hundreds of Ahrar al-Sham and other 
fighters from Idlib through its territory 
to Aleppo to help defend Azaz against the 
YPG. Ankara also shelled newly captured 
areas and other targets related to the YPG, 
drawing US criticism but achieving little 
effect. Turkey had originally tried to pre-
empt a YPG advance by proposing to turn 
most of the strip separating Afrin from 
the northeast into a safe zone that shields 
civilians from Assad and Islamic State. But 
the idea quickly ran into opposition from 
the United States, and even a drastic reduc-
tion in size – from an area 100 km wide and 
25 km deep to the town of Azaz and its sur-
roundings – failed to get it off the ground. 
Turkey Bets on Losing Horses 
The YPG’s territorial gains exposed Ankara’s 
failure to build an effective ally in Syria, de-
spite early ties to the rebels. The north was 
home to the first defectors from Assad’s 
military who crossed into Turkey looking 
for safety and support. When the protest 
movement started and Ankara’s entreaties 
for genuine democratic reforms failed to 
convince Assad, then-Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan declared himself de facto 
protector of Syria’s Sunni majority, yet 
avoided direct Turkish involvement. Turkey 
appears to have expected Assad not to last, 
and to see him replaced by a friendly regime 
led by the Muslim Brotherhood. Such a sce-
nario would have placed Ankara in a prime 
position to reap economic and political 
benefits from a post-Arab Spring Middle 
East molded by Turkey and hinged on Syria. 
Prior to the revolt, Syria became a vital 
transport link and a nascent commercial 
springboard from Turkey to the Levant and 
the Arab Peninsula, as Ankara cancelled visa 
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requirements and struck trade deals that 
helped boost Turkish exports to the region. 
Expecting an Islamist ascendancy after 
Assad, Ankara supported the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood in its power struggles within the 
mainstream political opposition, which had 
organized itself formally in Istanbul in late 
2011. But the Brotherhood’s control evapo-
rated after Saudi Arabia elbowed its own 
allies into the National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolution and Opposition Forces in 2013. 
Militarily, Ankara has thrown its support 
mainly behind Ahrar al-Sham. Despite battle-
field gains before the Russian campaign, 
Ahrar al-Sham ended up deeply under-
mined by internal contradictions. Many of 
the fighters also loathed the heavy-handed 
tutelage by Turkish intelligence, not least 
in operational matters and frequent changes 
in the levels of supply and financial sup-
port. Similar to smaller rebel groups with 
links to Ankara, Ahrar al-Sham was also 
undermined by inconsistencies in Turkish 
support due to what many in the group and 
the wider opposition regard as differences 
over Syria between Turkey’s intelligence 
services and its military. 
Still, Turkey helped to control the chron-
ic differences within Ahrar al-Sham. Despite 
its Salafist foundations, many less-ideologi-
cal members still saw the organization as 
part of a popular revolt to replace Assad’s 
rule with a pluralist system and resisted the 
domination of the jihadist wing. Such ideo-
logical divisions resurfaced, however, after 
Ankara helped nudge Ahrar al-Sham to par-
ticipate in an opposition meeting in Riyadh 
in December 2015, where a unified political 
platform ahead of the Geneva talks was agree 
upon. The organization also suffers from 
internal tensions over alleged enrichment 
and privileges. For instance, complaints have 
been rife against the commander of Ahrar 
al-Sham in Idlib, Abu Khuzaima, who built 
a business from smuggling and extortion at 
the Bab al-Hawa border-crossing. Attempts 
by senior ranks in Ahrar al-Sham to remove 
Khuzaima failed, as the self-styled “Emir of 
the Border” has amassed a private army and 
a fleet of car-mounted machine guns. 
Such differences have caused increasing 
numbers of defections to Jabhat al-Nusra, 
which is more self-reliant financially and 
perceived as ideologically coherent. Despite 
the cooperation of the two groups in the 
Jaish al-Fatah alliance, violence and turf 
warfare persisted between them. By late 
2015 Jaish al-Fatah practically ceased to 
exist, and in March 2016 Jabhat al-Nusra 
took advantage of the ceasefire – from which 
it is explicitly excluded – to overrun a West-
ern-backed FSA brigade based in the town 
of Ma’arrat al-Nu’maan, near Idlib. Yet they 
encountered an apparent popular backlash 
there, as the relative calm encouraged pro-
tests against Jabhat al-Nusra in Idlib and 
elsewhere, as well as demonstrations echo-
ing the peaceful demands for the downfall 
of the Assad regime at the beginning of the 
revolt. Across rebel Syria, the demonstra-
tors appeared to be rejecting the jihadist 
takeovers as well as Assad. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
By March 2016, six months of Russian 
bombing had turned rebel formations into 
isolated pieces on a chessboard, besieged 
and without scope to fortify one another. 
Internal strife and turf wars reinforce this 
fragmentation. The cessation of hostilities, 
which forbids the capture of new territory, 
has given rebels some breathing room. But 
they are still under enormous pressure. 
Riyadh, their main Arab backer, remains 
bogged down in Yemen, which it regards as 
more vital to its security, and is looking for 
a way out. Having pushed the opposition 
to go to Geneva, Saudi Arabia may well go 
along with a deal that eventually removes 
Assad without fundamental changes to the 
system, allowing Riyadh to clinch a sym-
bolic victory of taking out a main Iranian 
ally. In reality, Tehran has been making 
de facto territorial annexations in areas it 
regards as strategic, relying on Hezbollah 
and Iraqi militia as well as Syrian Shiite 
auxiliaries trained and equipped by Tehran. 
Moscow, which appears keen to reclaim 
some of the international clout it enjoyed 
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in the pre-1990 bi-polar world order, may 
eventually engineer an exit for Assad, thus 
underlining that it can deliver solutions. 
But Russia has shown little interest in a po-
litical settlement that goes beyond scratch-
ing the surface of the current regime, let 
alone establishing accountability for vio-
lence and war crimes, or a genuinely repre-
sentative political order. More in tune with 
the Russian approach would be to trade 
democratic demands against a token expan-
sion of the Sunni facade of the regime by 
co-opting a number of opposition figures. 
The regime, for its part, has shown no 
interest in a transition. It appears to regard 
the cessation of hostilities as a piecemeal 
prelude to rebel capitulation along the lines 
of the “National Reconciliations” that occur-
red in besieged areas between 2013 and 2015. 
Rebel surrenders in all but name, these agree-
ments were often followed by new arrests 
and forced recruitment into Assad’s army. 
As long as the Alawite security core, 
which is largely invisible, stays intact, Mos-
cow’s interests – along with the authori-
tarian political order in Syria – will be pre-
served. Under this scenario, meaningful 
opposition will remain confined to activists 
in exile, which is likely to become perma-
nent for the thousands of dissidents and 
peaceful activists who fled torture and death. 
Germany and some EU countries, as well as 
the United States, appear currently to be 
interested in achieving a lasting solution to 
the conflict according to the international 
framework, which calls for an inclusive 
transitional governing body with full execu-
tive powers and the continuity of a func-
tioning government. German politicians 
should resist tendencies to take democratic 
window dressing at face value that is moti-
vated by the urge to end the refugee crisis 
and what they see as the militant threat 
from Syria in the wake of the Brussels 
attacks, and instead insist on a thorough 
reform of the security sector. 
As long as the security apparatus and 
government militias operate beyond any 
control and accountability – and opponents 
are imprisoned, tortured, and killed – the 
return of a sizeable number of the mostly 
Sunni refugees is not likely, nor would it 
be safe or humane to send them back. 
Procedurally, UN envoy Staffan de Mistura 
had envisaged the Geneva process to estab-
lish four tracks, including one concerning 
the “military, security and counter-terror-
ism.” But with the international focus on 
curbing jihadists in Syria, there might be a 
tendency to sweep the arbitrary powers and 
entrenched sectarianism of the security 
sector and the flaws in the judicial system 
under the rug. 
The more immediate issue is to uphold 
the ceasefire. One way to convert the cessa-
tion of hostilities into a durable arrange-
ment would be for Germany and other mem-
bers of the ceasefire taskforce to formalize 
the deal and establish a transparent moni-
toring and sanctioning mechanism. This 
would make it more difficult to change the 
status quo through violence and also make 
Russia and the United States more account-
able. 
Meanwhile, the ceasefire remains fragile. 
For example, Turkey, which has been alarmed 
by the Kurdish advance, could substantially 
increase flows to the rebels, encouraging 
them to strike back. Robbed of intensive 
Russian air support, Assad may try to play 
Iran off against Russia and renew the push 
– with backing from Shiite militia – to cut 
off the remaining outlets that link opposi-
tion areas in the interior to Turkey. 
If the rebels give up, as the regime hopes, 
they may join the refugee trek to Europe, 
or try to blend back into civilian life, with 
some continuing clandestine or terrorist 
insurgent activities. So far, rebel weakness 
wreaked by the Russian strikes appears to 
have benefited mainly Jabhat al-Nusra and, 
to a lesser degree, Islamic State. Renewed 
conflict looms, together with further 
radicalization of Syrian Sunnis, if Alawite 
control of the police state and the latter’s 
domination over society continues. 
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